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Quality Certification by Geographical Indications, Trademarks, and Firm Reputation 
 
1. Introduction 
Some of the challenges in delivering quality products in the agricultural and food sector are rooted in 
the possible market failure identified by Akerlof (1970) in situations characterized by asymmetric 
information and moral hazard problems. An interesting market-based solution to this problem is 
possible when a product’s quality attributes are not observable to the buyer prior to purchase but 
they are readily determined at consumption, and it relies on the notion of firm “reputation,” which 
here refers to the buyers’ beliefs about the quality associated with a firm’s product. Key instruments 
for supporting a firm’s reputation are trademarks. Specifically, when firms can identify themselves to 
consumers through trademarks, thereby effectively defining their own brand of the product, they 
can build a reputation about their quality by consistently supplying it over time. This notion is due to 
the seminal treatment of Klein and Leffler (1981), with Shapiro (1983) providing an earlier insightful 
modeling structure. The emergence of this information about quality is achieved in competitive 
markets through an equilibrium price structure that provides the necessary incentives for 
competitive firms to develop and maintain reputation for producing a given quality. It is also shown 
that reputation is an imperfect mechanism for assuring quality and that high-quality items can only 
be provided at a premium above production costs.  
 Trademarks are essential tools for most modern firms; their functions are well understood 
and supported by established legal statutes in most developed countries, and established trademarks 
constitute an extremely valuable intangible asset for many businesses (Landes and Posner 2003). In 
agricultural and food industries, however, a related but distinct notion is that of geographical 
indications (GIs). Like trademarks, GIs are a form of branding, and they specifically focus on the 
use of names connected with the geographic origin of the product. The use of GIs has a long history 
in the European Union (EU), and GIs enjoy growing popularity in emerging markets and 
developing economies (EU 2008; WIPO 2007). As a form of intellectual property, GIs figure 
prominently in the 1994 TRIPS agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Unlike 
trademarks, which are quintessentially private goods, GIs provide common labels that are typically 
accessible to a large number of firms producing similar (and competing) products. Furthermore, it is 
very common to observe the concurrent use of GIs and trademarks for branding products of the 
agricultural and food industries (Bramley and Kirsten 2007). For example, wine labeled with a 
particular GI (e.g., Chianti) is supplied by a large number of firms, each with its own distinctive 
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trademark. But if a firm’s reputation for quality can be sustained by its own private trademark, as the 
strand of literature following Shapiro’s (1983) seminal work suggests, what exactly is the role of GIs? 
The public-good nature of GI labels inevitably raises the issue of a collective aspect to the reputation 
enjoyed by groups of like firms. In the context of reputation mechanisms, the challenge is to 
understand how private and public elements can profitably coexist in this setting, and to elucidate 
the specific informational roles of trademarks and GIs. This is the main objective of our analysis. 
In this paper we extend the theory of firm reputation as a mechanism to assure quality in 
competitive markets to a context in which both GI certification and trademarks are available to 
firms as quality indicators. We argue that our focus on quality is fully justified in the context of GIs 
by the presumption of a quality-geography nexus, an element that is explicitly codified in many 
forms of GIs and implicit in virtually all of them. The model we propose in this paper relies on 
Shapiro’s (1983) notion of reputation, which we extend to reflect both collective and firm-specific 
reputations in competitive markets. By casting the analysis in such a framework, we naturally assume 
that quality attributes in the agricultural and food products of interest to us are best understood as 
experience goods. A related implication, therefore, is that consumers do not have a preference for 
geography per se, but care about the geographical attribute noted in many GIs because of their 
ability to signal intrinsic quality. We also note that Shapiro’s (1983) modeling framework, with its 
insistence on competitive equilibrium conditions, is particularly suited to being extended to study 
GIs, as these markets are typically characterized by the presence of numerous autonomous firms 
that make independent business decisions and retain their own profits but share a GI label while 
acting in competitive conditions (Fishman et al. 2008; Moschini, Menapace, and Pick 2008).  
The model that we develop presumes that an initial investment via the production of high-
quality product is necessary for a firm to gain private reputation. Collective reputation is obtained 
through certification and is determined by the conditions required for certification (e.g., minimum 
quality, production technology, etc.). In equilibrium, quality in excess of the minimum commands a 
premium above marginal costs, which, as in Shapiro (1983), represents a fair return on the private 
investment in reputation. In this setting, GI certification reduces the cost of building reputation by 
constraining the moral hazard behavior of producers. In our setting, GIs and trademarks turn out to 
be complementary means for signaling quality in agricultural and food markets. In particular, 
credible collective certification schemes for GIs support the creation of information regarding 
quality, reduce the cost of establishing reputation, and lead to welfare gains. The reputation 
approach to the problem of moral hazard also draws attention to the fact that the type of GI 
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certification scheme used might matter. Specifically, our model can differentiate the two primary 
certification schemes currently used for GIs, the European-style sui generis scheme and the American-
style scheme based on certification marks. These schemes differ substantially with regard to the 
requirements for individual firms to obtain certification. In a second-best world with asymmetric 
information, it turns out that these differences are relevant because they affect the collective 
reputation of certified products and hence the cost of providing quality.  
Several instructive aspects of the role of certification in quality provision and reputation 
formation emerge from the model. First, we show that GI certification reduces the divergence 
between the reputation equilibrium and the equilibrium that would prevail under perfect information 
by lowering the cost of establishing reputation compared to a situation with only trademarks. Hence, 
GI certification improves the ability of reputation to operate as a mechanism for assuring quality, 
even when a fully functioning trademark system already exists. Second, we provide a motivation for 
industry resistance to the introduction of GI certification because producers who have already 
invested in reputation building can be adversely affected. Interestingly, we find that motives for 
industry resistance are not limited to those that are excluded from the certification but can also arise 
for producers who are eligible for certification but already sell high-quality product when 
certification is introduced. This is because GI certification raises the price that entrants can 
command, thereby reducing the cost of reputation building and the value of established reputation. 
Our model also has interesting implications for the current debate and negotiations over alternative 
forms of protection for GIs at the WTO (Fink and Maskus 2006) and the ongoing consultations on 
product quality policy reform within the European Union. The results we derive provide a rationale 
for favoring an EU-style sui generis scheme over certification marks. 
GIs have recently attracted the interest of academics in economics, marketing, law, and 
sociology. In particular, the economics literature on GIs has analyzed various aspects of their ability 
to work as a certification tool in alleviating market failures due to the presence of asymmetric 
information when quality cannot be credibly signaled otherwise (Zago and Pick 2004; Anania and 
Nisticó 2004; Lence et al. 2007; Moschini, Menapace, and Pick 2008). The role of collective 
reputation for agricultural goods is investigated by Winfree and McCluskey (2005) in a setting where 
market price depends on the industry average quality (and where, unlike the model we develop, all 
firms sell the same quality). To the best of our knowledge, two of the main areas of emphasis of our 
analysis—the concurrent use of trademarks and GIs in a reputation model, and the comparison of 
alternative forms of GIs—have not been investigated in any of the existing studies. 
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In what follows, we first provide a brief review of the institutional setting for GIs and then 
introduce the model and the reputation formation mechanism. Next, we define and derive a long-
run, rational-expectation, stationary Nash equilibrium under three different scenarios characterized 
by the use of trademarks and (i) the absence of a certification scheme, (ii) the presence of a sui generis 
GI certification scheme, and (iii) the presence of a certification mark scheme. We characterize the 
equilibrium price-quality schedules that apply to the various scenarios and discuss the main 
economic implications and associated welfare effects.  
 
2. Institutional Framework 
GIs are typically names of places or regions used to brand goods. Many GIs pertain to wines (e.g., 
Burgundy), agricultural products (e.g., Thai Hom Mali rice), and foods (e.g., Parmigiano-Reggiano 
cheese), but non-food products such as handicrafts and textiles can also be covered by GIs, 
particularly those from developing countries (e.g., Mysore silk).1 The distinctive feature of GIs is 
that the quality attributes of the goods they identify are considered to be inherently linked to the 
nature of the geographic location in which production takes place (e.g., climate conditions, soil 
composition, local knowledge), i.e., to the notion of “terroir” (Barham 2003; Josling 2006).2 GIs are 
considered one of the earliest instruments used to counteract market failures resulting from 
asymmetric information (Rangnekar 2004), and their protection has a long tradition in Europe 
dating back to the fifteenth century (O’Connor 2004). However, following the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy reform in 1992, which moved EU policies progressively away from price 
supports towards programs to promote food quality and rural development, GIs have taken center 
stage as the “main pillar of the EU’s quality policy on agricultural products” (EU 2003). GIs can also 
be viewed as a distinct form of intellectual property (IP) rights, and as such they figure prominently 
in the TRIPS agreement of the WTO and have also received significant international attention 
outside of the EU (Moschini 2004). In particular, significant interest in GIs has emerged recently 
among developing countries.3
                                                          
1 Other agricultural products not intended for human consumption are ornamental plants, flowers, 
cork, hay, cochineal, wool, wicker, and essential oils. 
  
 
2 See the definition of GIs in the TRIPS agreement (Article 22.1).  
 
3For example, several countries are introducing or expanding their own GI laws, regulations, and 
promotion programs, including China (Xiaobing and Kireeva 2007), India (Rao 2006), South Korea 
(Suh and MacPherson 2007), and Colombia (Teuber 2010). Noteworthy is the Kenian-Swiss 
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As for other types of branding (e.g., trademarks), the ability of GIs to alleviate market 
failures due to the presence of asymmetric information rests on their credibility, thus necessitating 
IP protection. While trademark protection is well established and relatively harmonized across 
countries, the protection of GIs varies to a large degree, and its implementation is a question of 
intense disagreement in ongoing WTO negotiations. The TRIPS agreement requires countries to 
provide legal means for protecting GIs against unfair competition, but it does not specify the means 
by which protection should be provided.  
Two primary legal notions are used to protect GIs. Perhaps most common are sui generis 
schemes originally developed and used in Roman law countries and currently adopted in the 
European Union (OECD 2000) and in several Asian and a few North American and Latin American 
countries (WIPO 2007).4
The presence of a quality-geography nexus, i.e., the requirement of a specific link between a 
good’s qualities and its geographical origin, represents the main distinctive characteristic of any sui 
generis scheme. In other words, for a geographic name that identifies a given good to be eligible to 
receive this sui generis IP protection, evidence must be provided that the quality or characteristics of 
the good are due to the natural and human factors (e.g., climate, soil quality, local knowledge) 
characterizing the geographic area of origin (e.g., EU Reg. 510/2006 Art. 2 and Art. 4.2.f). In 
addition to the existence of a specific quality/geography link, the European sui generis scheme also 
 Examples include protected designations of origin (PDOs) and protected 
geographical indications (PGIs), two sui generis GI schemes that are used widely for agricultural and 
food products within the European Union. Regulations concerning these schemes are harmonized 
across all EU member countries and, since 2008, also cover wines (EU Reg. 479/2008, Art. 34). 
Well-known products that are registered as PDOs include Parmigiano Reggiano cheese and Chianti 
wine. Tuscany extra virgin olive oil instead represents an example of a GI registered as a PGI. The 
distinction between these two alternative sui generis GI schemes is based upon the nature of the 
quality-geography nexus (i.e., the notion of terroir), in which PDOs require a stronger link between 
the natural environment of production and the quality attributes of the product (for additional 
details regarding the distinction between PDO and PGI see EU Reg. 510/2006, Art. 2).   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ongoing project aimed at establishing a functioning GI protection scheme in Kenya and at raising 
awareness on GIs in the East African Community member states (see the Swiss Institute of 
Intellectual Property’s website at https://www.ige.ch/en.html).  
 
4 These include China, Mongolia, North Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Colombia, Venezuela, Cuba, and 
Costa Rica. 
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requires the definition of a code of rules for each GI product (commonly referred to in the literature 
as the “specification”). The specification details all the product characteristics, may restrict the 
admissible production process, and identifies the geographic area in which production takes place 
(EU Reg. 510/2006 Art. 4).5
Alternatively, in common law countries, including the United States, GIs are protected 
within the standard trademark system and are usually registered as certification marks.
 Provided these conditions are met, sui generis schemes are not 
exclusionary in the sense that usage rights over a GI are granted to all producers within a designated 
production area who comply with the product specification (EU Reg. 510/2006 Art. 8).   
6 Certification 
marks simply certify that products meet given conditions and, in the case of GIs, the only such 
condition is the geographic area of production. In the United States, for example, the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) does not scrutinize certification mark applications based on the 
characteristics to be certified or require the definition of quality standards. Indeed, when a 
certification mark includes a geographic name, it is understood that the only attribute to be certified 
is the origin of the good (USPTO 2007). It is critical to emphasize that, as for sui generis systems, the 
right to use a certification mark is collective in nature. All producers who operate within the 
geographic area indicated by the GI have access to certification and can use (subject to obtaining 
certification) the GI to label their products. This contrasts sharply with usage rights over trademarks, 
which are private and belong to a single entity or firm.7
 
  
3. Model 
In the model we develop the presumption that consumers’ interest in the geographical origin of 
products is due to the implication that this might have for the quality of the product. This view is 
consistent with the quality/geography nexus that is explicitly invoked to rationalize GIs in the EU 
                                                          
5 The product characteristics include the physical, chemical, microbiological, and organoleptic 
characteristics of the raw materials and of the final product. 
 
6 In the United States, certification marks used for GIs are registered with the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office. 
 
7 Only under special circumstances, specifically when a geographic term has acquired a “secondary 
meaning,” can a GI be registered as a trademark. When the “secondary meaning” of a geographic 
name is, in the consumers’ minds, a production or manufacturing source (while the primary meaning 
is the geographic place), then it is possible under U.S. trademark law to register a geographic name 
as a trademark, a private rather than collective IP right (USPTO 2007). 
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but it is also implicit for many other GIs, as discussed in the previous section. In other words, 
consumers do not have a preference for geography per se (e.g., interest in Napa Valley wines is 
predicated on the belief that they might enjoy superior quality and not because of quality-unrelated 
considerations pertaining to this valley). Furthermore, our reputation modeling approach treats 
quality as an experience attribute (as opposed to, say, a credence attribute). The idea that food 
products typically ought to be treated as experience goods can be traced back to Nelson’s (1970) 
introduction of this concept and is well established in the economics literature (e.g., Ali and Nauges 
2007).8
Consider the market for an experience good (e.g., parmesan cheese, sparkling wine, dry-
cured ham) that can be produced in a continuum of qualities indexed by 
 As for quality, we will model it as a one-dimensional attribute. This is, admittedly, a 
simplification of reality. But this approach permits considerable gains in terms of analytical 
tractability while allowing us to provide a useful characterization of the joint use of trademarks and 
GIs.  
)0 ,q q∈ ∞ , where 0q  is the 
minimum quality standard (MQS) allowed in the market (e.g., the minimum quality necessary to 
meet consumer safety and sanitary conditions and/or other regulatory provisions necessary for 
lawful marketing of the product). The presumption is that this MQS is enforced by the government 
and it is common knowledge that all producers meet it. We assume that there are two production 
areas—the GI region and the other region—and that these two regions enjoy different production 
technologies vis-à-vis the production of quality. Specifically, the production of one unity of good of 
quality q  costs ( )Gc q  in the GI region and ( )c q  in the other region. The GI technology is available 
only in the GI region whereas the standard technology is available in the other region.9
( )Gc q
 These 
technologies satisfy standard conditions; specifically,  and ( )c q  are assumed to be continuous, 
(strictly) increasing and (strictly) convex functions of quality, that is, ( ) 0,qc q >  ( ) 0,qqc q >  ( ) 0,
G
qc q >  
and ( ) 0.Gqqc q >  Furthermore, we assume that the GI technology ( )
Gc q displays a cost advantage in 
the production of higher-quality products whereas the conventional technology ( )c q  possesses a 
                                                          
8 Whereas the quality attributes of interest here are best thought of as experience goods, we 
recognized that other attributes of food products (e.g., organic, non-genetically modified, pathogen-
free) could alternatively fit Darby and Karni’s (1973) notion of credence goods. Roe and Sheldon 
(2007) study labeling options for such goods.  
 
9 As will become apparent, in the context of our model it would make no difference to assume that 
the conventional technology ( )c q  is available everywhere.    
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cost advantage in the production of lower-quality products. More precisely, we assume that there 
exists a threshold quality level q  such that 
(1) 
 
( ) ( ), for all  
( ) ( ), for all  
G
G
c q c q q q
c q c q q q
> <
< >


 
and, of course, ( ) ( ).Gc q c q=   This assumption, which mirrors the comparative advantage condition 
postulated by Falvey (1989) in an international context, is intended to capture the notion of terroir, 
that is, the fact that the nature and characteristics of the production conditions in GI regions 
facilitate the attainment of higher quality levels (the quality/geography nexus discussed earlier).  
We analyze a competitive setting where all producers are price-takers and where the industry 
(both in the conventional and GI product sectors) is characterized by free entry, consistent with the 
typical non-exclusionary nature of most GIs discussed earlier.10 Each active firm is assumed to 
produce a fixed quantity of output per period, normalized to unity, and to choose the quality level of 
its product. 11
The demand side of the model arises from a population of consumers who are 
heterogeneous with respect to their taste for quality.
  To capture the inherently dynamic nature of reputation, the model is dynamic and 
firms potentially operate for an infinite number of periods.  
12
[0, ]θ θ∈
 We assume that there is a continuum of 
consumer types, indexed by the parameter  with distribution ( ).F θ  Consistent with 
previous literature, we assume that consumers purchase one unit of the product with the quality that 
provides the highest positive surplus, or otherwise buy nothing, where the surplus from purchasing 
quality q  at price p  for a consumer of type θ  is given by 
(2) θ −( , ) .U q p  
For the purpose of deriving market price-quality relationships that can arise in a competitive 
equilibrium we need only minimal assumptions on consumer preferences. Specifically, we postulate 
                                                          
10 The role of competitive markets and free entry into the GI sector is also discussed in some detail 
in Moschini, Menapace, and Pick (2008). 
 
11 Fixing the size of the firm allows the model to abstract from whether there are economies or 
diseconomies of scale in establishing reputation. The issue of economies of scale in establishing 
collective reputation has been addressed by Fishman et al. 2008. The relationship between firm size, 
investment in quality and individual brand reputation is investigated by Choi (1997), Cabral (2000) 
and Rob and Fishman (2005). 
 
12 It is taste heterogeneity with regard to quality that supports a range of different qualities in the 
market equilibrium.  
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that 0qU > (consumers value quality) and that 0Uθ >  (consumers with higher values of θ  value 
quality more). Note that, given this preference structure in (2), consumers treat brands of like quality 
to be perfect substitutes. Of course, as discussed earlier, the actual quality supplied to consumers is 
not observable prior to purchase. The assumption here, therefore, is that consumers form 
conjectures as to the actual quality they should expect from a given firm based on the firm’s 
reputation.
 
 
3.1. Reputation and Information Structure 
In the literature on the economics of information, the concept of reputation is formalized in various 
ways depending upon the source of the uncertainty regarding quality (Bar-Isaac and Tadelis 2008). 
When quality uncertainty is due to unobservable characteristics (markets primarily characterized by 
adverse selection problems), reputation is commonly modeled as consumer beliefs regarding a firm’s 
type and is assumed to evolve based on signals (e.g., the firm’s performance). When, as in our case, 
the uncertainty regarding quality is primarily due to unobservable actions (markets characterized by 
moral hazard problems), reputation ultimately concerns the buyers’ beliefs about a producer’s 
equilibrium actions. Perhaps the most coherent modeling structure for that purpose is provided by 
the use of repeated games, where the expectation of repeated interaction between buyers and sellers 
provides both the means for a reputation for quality to be established and for deviation from 
equilibria to be punished.  
It is well known that repeated games can give rise to a plethora of equilibria, and the case of 
reputation is no exception. Shapiro (1983), building on the earlier insight of Klein and Leffler (1981), 
provides an interesting equilibrium solution. The key idea is that consumers’ beliefs about a seller’s 
unobserved actions about quality are based on the producer’s past quality choices, which are 
observed ex post (recall that we are dealing with an experience good). In principle, such a firm’s 
reputation can be modeled as dependent on the entire history of its quality choices, but Shapiro 
(1983) shows that the qualitative insights to be garnered are robust to the actual mechanism of 
reputation formation that is postulated. Given that, we adopt the simplest form of reputation-
building that captures the essence of the problem at hand and assume that the reputation for firm k  
at time t  is given by 1.
k k
t tR q −=  In other words, at any given point in time, a firm is expected to 
provide the quality level that it supplied in the previous period. This naïve expectation turns out to 
be validated in the equilibrium that we characterize in what follows and thus, in this sense, 
10 
 
consumers are rational. Because consumers cannot observe quality at the time of purchase and rely 
on reputation, by deviating from equilibrium producers could, of course, surprise consumers (for 
one period) with a lower quality than expected. Such a quality cut would be discovered by 
consumers (with a one-period delay), and consumers would punish sellers by boycotting the brand 
thereafter (Allen 1984).13
For such a reputation to work as a mechanism for signaling a firm’s quality, it is essential that 
consumers be able to clearly identify the identity of firms. Brand names, trademarks, and, in our 
context, GI labels are tools that permit such a consumer recognition and are fundamental for 
reputation to arise in equilibrium. 
 
 
3.2. Branding Options: Trademarks and GI Labels 
Firms use brands to clearly identify their product in the eye of consumers. In our setting, a brand 
can be a trademark, a combination of a trademark and a GI label, or merely a GI label. Trademarks 
convey firm-specific reputation whereas the GI label alone conveys collective reputation. A 
combination of a trademark and a GI label, of course, mingles firm-specific and collective 
reputations in a way that depends on the specific nature of the GI. We assume that each producer 
can, at any time, adopt and use a trademark at no cost (other than that needed to establish a 
reputation) and that there is an infinite supply of potential trademark names. Instead, to be able to 
use a GI label, a producer needs to obtain certification. To obtain certification, of course, producers 
need to meet the specific conditions (including geographical origin) spelled out by the GI. We 
consider two alternative GI labeling systems in turn, certification marks and the EU-style sui generis 
system. The latter not only makes an explicit claim on the quality/geography nexus but, as noted, 
also spells out detailed specifications that constrain the production process and the GI product’s 
attributes. In our model we interpret this additional requirement of a sui generis GI system as 
mandating a GI-specific MQS, labeled 0 .
Gq  We assume that 0 0
Gq q≥ , that is, the minimum quality 
standard imposed by a GI scheme is at least as strict as the baseline standard that applies to all 
products. 
                                                          
13 Because brand ownership is not observable to consumers, a producer that has cheated and has 
lost all his customers could re-enter the market using a different brand, which of course would 
require a new reputation-building investment. 
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 Consistent with the collective nature of GI rights, we assume that all producers who satisfy 
the certification requirements for a given GI are entitled to its use. Finally, we postulate an economy 
with a fully credible trademark system and a fully credible certification scheme for GIs (i.e., there is 
no counterfeit product on the market and all certified products meet the requirements established by 
the certification scheme). To simplify the presentation of our results, we also assume no specific 
costs, over and above the production costs ( )c q  and ( )Gc q , associated with the use of trademarks or 
GI certification. 
 
4. Long-Run Partial Equilibrium 
We consider a rational-expectation, stationary Nash equilibrium in a long-run partial equilibrium 
setting.14
( )p q
 Specifically, the reputation equilibrium we consider is a steady-state configuration with a 
price function across qualities, , and a distribution of firms, ( )n q , such that (i) each consumer, 
knowing ( )p q , chooses his most preferred quality level or decides not to purchase anything; (ii) 
markets clear at every level of quality (thus determining ( )n q ); (iii) any firm with reputation R  finds 
it optimal to produce quality q R=  rather than to deviate; and (iv) there is no further entry or exit. 
 Following Shapiro (1983), we focus on the case in which all other factors of production are 
in perfectly elastic supply. This is, admittedly, a restrictive condition for agricultural and food 
products where land is constrained in the aggregate (so that its supply to any individual industry is 
upward sloping). Whereas we believe that such an upward-sloping supply could be accommodated 
in our context, it would considerably complicate the analysis without affecting the qualitative 
insights that we wish to characterize.15
                                                          
14 Consumer expectations of quality are adaptive but rational in equilibrium: consumers expect firms 
to maintain their reputation and firms do so. 
 Specifically, the assumption of perfect competition with free 
entry permits us to derive equilibrium price-quality schedules that depend only on the cost-of-quality 
structure, and the condition that all factors of production are in perfectly elastic supply makes such 
costs independent of factor market supplies and of the nature and extent of market demand for the 
specific product under consideration. The latter means that we can derive equilibrium price-quality 
schedules for very general demand conditions, i.e., for all consumer preferences satisfying basic 
 
15 Also, for a number of GIs that individually account for a small share of a region’s agricultural 
output, the assumption that all factors of production are in perfectly elastic supply might not be 
unreasonable. Moschini, Menapace, and Pick (2008) discuss such examples. 
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postulates: (i) consumers are indifferent between products of equal quality; (ii) utility is strictly 
increasing in quality and strictly decreasing in the price paid for quality; and (iii) consumers have 
heterogeneous preferences regarding quality.16
In what follows, we consider three IP scenarios and derive the equilibrium market price-quality 
schedule for each scenario. The first scenario, our benchmark case, is one in which trademarks are 
the only branding option. In the second and third scenarios, we consider two alternative GI 
certification systems, the sui generis scheme and the certification mark scheme, respectively.  
  
 
4.1. The Benchmark Case with Trademarks Only 
Although the assumption here is that only trademarks can be used to sustain reputation, either of 
the production technologies—the standard technology ( )c q and the GI technology ( )Gc q —can be 
used to produce any given quality q . But the presumption is that when only trademarks are 
available, consumers cannot detect which technology is used in production. In equilibrium, 
therefore, it must be that a given quality q  is produced by the technology that carries the lowest 
production cost. Hence, for qualities q q≤   the standard technology is used, and for q q≥   the GI 
technology is used.17
Consider first a representative firm that uses the standard technology 
  
( )c q  and whose 
brand’s reputation in equilibrium is equal to q q≤  . At any point in time this firm can choose 
between two strategies: continue to supply the quality level q  or produce a lower quality than its 
reputation (i.e., “cheat”). If this firm remains honest (i.e., keeps producing quality q ), it earns a 
discounted profit equal to 1 ( ) ( )rr p q c q
+ −   , where 0r >  denotes the per-period interest rate. If the 
firm cheats by cutting quality, the most profitable avenue is to cut quality to the minimum level, 
thereby earning a one-period profit equal to 0( ) ( ).p q c q−  The credibility constraint, which 
                                                          
16 Assumptions (i) and (ii) rule out “irrelevant” price-quality combinations. Assumption (iii) supports 
a range of different qualities to be exchanged in equilibrium. 
 
17 Alternatively, because the production technology use cannot be credibly certified under a 
trademarks-only system, producers in the GI region wanting to sell qualities q q≤   could outsource 
production to the other region while retaining their own branded trademark (and vice versa for 
producers in the non-GI region wanting to sell qualities q q≥  ). 
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determines the range of prices for which the firm has no incentive to cheat, can therefore be written 
as  
(3)    ≥ + −  0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .p q c q r c q c q  
Next, consider a potential new entrant who wishes to establish a reputation for quality q . 
Being reputationless, this producer can only charge an entry price ep  for its product in the first 
(entry) period. As in Shapiro (1983), we argue that the presence of a potentially infinite supply of 
opportunistic (fly-by-night) sellers who could overrun the market with minimum quality 0q  implies 
that the entry price for a new brand is equal to the cost of producing minimum quality. Hence, 
0( ).ep c q=  In equilibrium, a potential entrant incurs a sure loss equal to 0( ) ( )c q c q−  in the entry 
period when the brand is still unknown and earns a profit equal to ( ) ( )p q c q−  in any subsequent 
period. Free entry requires discounted profits of potential new brands to be non-positive, that is, 
1
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0rc q c q p q c q− + − ≤   , and thus imposes a second restriction on the equilibrium price 
configuration, which can be written as 
(4) 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p q c q r c q c q≤ + −   . 
Together, the credibility constraint and the free-entry condition imply an equilibrium price-quality 
schedule for producers who use the standard technology equal to 
(5) 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      for A q c q r c q c q q q q ≡ + − ≤ ≤   . 
 Similar conditions can be derived for producers who sell qualities q q≥   using the GI 
technology ( )Gc q . Here, however, because the technology of production is undetectable for 
consumers, and the cost of in-house production of minimum quality using the GI technology 
exceeds the cost of outsourcing production to firms that use the standard technology, 
0 0( ) ( ),
Gc q c q>  the most profitable cheating option for producers who use the GI technology is 
outsourcing production at a cost equal to 0( ).c q  The credibility constraint for producers who use 
the GI technology is then equal to 
(6)  ≥ + − 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
G Gp q c q r c q c q  
Being unable to detect the technology of production (recall that at this point only individual 
trademarks are allowed), consumers are willing to pay 0( )c q  for any reputationless brand 
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independent of the actual technology used in production. The free entry condition for producers 
who use the GI technology is then equal to 
(7)  ≤ + − 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
G Gp q c q r c q c q  
Hence, for producers who use the GI technology, the credibility constraint and the free-entry 
condition together imply an equilibrium price-quality schedule equal to  
(8) 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      for .
G GB q c q r c q c q q q ≡ + − ≥    
 
Result 1: The market price-quality schedule that prevails in equilibrium when trademarks are the only available 
branding option is 
(9) 0
( ),      for [ , )
( )
( ),      for .
A q q q q
P q
B q q q
 ∈
≡ 
≥


  
 
The market schedule, ( )P q , as given in (9), is represented in Figure 1 by the bold curve. This 
equilibrium schedule reflects the assumption that consumers are indifferent between products of 
equal quality regardless of the underlying production technology (hence, they would purchase only 
brands with the lowest price for any given quality), and the fact that consumer utility is strictly 
increasing in quality (hence, consumers purchase only brands with the highest quality at any given 
price). As discussed earlier, in this setting it must be that qualities q q<   are produced with the 
standard technologies and qualities q q≥   are produced with the GI technology, where q  is the 
quality level that separates the two ranges over which the technologies have a cost advantage. Hence, 
when trademarks are the only branding option, each quality level 0q q≥  is produced using the 
technology with the lower production cost.   
 
4.2. The Sui Generis GI Certification Scheme 
Two features–the product specification and the collective nature—characterize the EU-type GI sui 
generis scheme and distinguish GI labels from trademarks. As discussed earlier, the specification 
details all the product characteristics, including the production process and the geographic area in 
which production takes place. We assume that the product specification is met when the product is 
produced with the GI technology (i.e., we abstract from enforcement issues, which are peripheral to 
the central point of our model), and thus any GI-certified product has quality 0
Gq q≥ , where 0
Gq  is 
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the GI-specific MQS under the sui generis scheme. Given the collective nature of GI labels, we 
assume that all producers who use the GI technology and meet the GI-specific MQS can use the GI 
label, alone or in combination with a private trademark, to brand their products.  
 Note that a GI label alone cannot support a reputation for a quality level above 0
Gq q> . Such 
a producer would be vulnerable to the competition (unrestricted, given free entry) of producers who 
would sell the lower (and cheaper to produce) quality 0
Gq  with the same label.18
0
Gq q>
 Hence, producers 
who want to service demand for qualities , and thus are required to build a reputation for a 
quality strictly in excess of 0
Gq , will need a private trademark in addition to the GI label. A firm that 
produces a quality in excess of 0
Gq  and uses a private trademark can in fact entirely capture the 
premium associated with the additional quality since consumers, through the trademark, can trace 
back the product’s quality to the specific individual firm. If the firm uses only a GI label, it can only 
partially capture the premium associated with the additional quality (i.e., it can only capture the 
premium associated with the increase in the average quality of the GI labeled product) but will still 
bear the full cost of the additional quality. Hence, a firm is better off using a trademark in addition 
to the GI label whenever 0
Gq q> . Knowing that, consumers also correctly infer that a product 
bearing the GI label alone is of quality 0
Gq , the minimum quality that can be certified under the sui 
generis scheme. 
The derivation of the equilibrium price-quality schedule for producers who certify under the 
sui generis scheme requires discussing the entry price that consumers are willing to pay for a GI-
certified product when the accompanying trademark is new (i.e., it has no established reputation). 
We argue that the entry price for a GI-certified product with a reputationless trademark is 0( )
G Gc q . 
To this end, we note that consumers know that the quality produced by an entrant who certifies and 
wants to stay in business must be such that the entrant’s brand is (at least weakly) preferred over 
alternative brands of equal quality once reputation is built and, hence, that the quality must be above 
a given threshold. Given this piece of information, a GI-certified product at an entry price equal to 
0( )
G Gc q  is attractive to consumers. At the same time, any price above 0( )
G Gc q  would attract fly-by-
night producers supplying unlimited quantity of quality 0
Gq . Hence, there cannot be an equilibrium 
in which consumers pay more than 0( )
G Gc q  for an entrant’s product of any quality.  
                                                          
18 This is essentially what happens in Winfree and McCluskey’s (2005) model. 
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In equilibrium, an entrant with a given quality q  would incur a loss equal to 0( ) ( )
G G Gc q c q−  
in the (reputation-building) entry period and would earn a profit equal to ( ) ( )Gp q c q−  in any 
subsequent period. Hence, free entry imposes the following restriction on the equilibrium price 
configuration for producers who use the GI technology and GI certification: 
(10) 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
G G G Gp q c q r c q c q ≤ + −   
It is critical to observe that the presence of certification constrains the moral hazard behavior of GI-
labeled producers by limiting their ability to cut costs when they reduce quality. Once a trademarked 
product is known to consumers and it is GI-certified, the firm must continue certifying; otherwise, 
consumers would anticipate that the firm is cutting quality.19
1 ( ) ( )Grr p q c q
+  − 
 If, in equilibrium, a firm that certifies 
remains honest (i.e., continues producing the same quality), it earns a discounted profit equal to 
. Also, conditional on certifying, the most profitable cheating avenue is to produce 
minimum quality 0
Gq  at cost 0( )
G Gc q , earning a one-period profit equal to 0( ) ( ).
G Gp q c q−  Hence, the 
credibility constraint for a firm with a reputable trademark and that GI-certifies can be written as  
(11) 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
G G G Gp q c q r c q c q ≥ + −   
The credibility constraint and free entry together imply that the price-quality schedule for certifying 
producers is equal to 
(12) 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )     for .
G G G G GG q c q r c q c q q q ≡ + − ≥    
Now suppose that a firm has built a particular reputation 0
GR q q= > . Could the firm maintain this 
reputation through the use of a trademark alone, i.e., dropping the use of the GI label? It turns out 
that that is not possible because if a firm were to stop certifying once its trademark is reputable, the 
firm’s incentives to cut quality would change compared to the case in which the firm continues 
certifying. Without certification, the most profitable cheating avenue is to produce quality 0q  at cost 
0( )c q , which earns a one-period profit equal to 0( ) ( )p q c q− . Hence, the credibility constraint for a 
firm that does not certify when its trademark is reputable is  
(13) 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
G Gp q c q r c q c q ≥ + −   
                                                          
19 In the case of a firm using a pure GI label as a brand, discontinuing certification means selling an 
unbranded product, which is expected by consumers to be of baseline minimum quality 0 .q   
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It follows that, without GI certification, no price exists that would satisfy both the credibility and 
free entry condition (as long as 0
Gq q> ). 
Producers who use the GI technology can also decide not to certify at all. In this case, the 
price-quality schedule for producers who use the GI technology but do not certify coincides with 
the schedule already derived under the benchmark case, as given by (8). Similarly, the presence of a 
sui generis scheme does not affect the price-quality schedule of producers who use the standard 
technology, for whom no certification is available under this scheme. For them, the price-quality 
schedule coincides with (5). 
The equilibrium market price-quality schedule prevailing in the presence of the sui generis 
scheme corresponds to the lower envelope of the three schedules in (5), (8), and (12), but depending 
on the value of 0
Gq , this schedule takes different forms. When 0
Gq  is suitably low, Result 2(a) applies; 
for intermediate values of 0
Gq , the condition in Result 2(b) is derived; and when 0
Gq is large enough, 
Result 2(c) is obtained. 
 
Result 2(a): When 0 0 , '
Gq q q∈   , the market price-quality schedule that prevails in equilibrium under a sui generis 
scheme is 
(14) 0
ˆ( ),       for [ , )
( )
ˆ( ),       for 
G A q q q qP q
G q q q
 ∈
≡ 
≥  
where we define qˆ  and 'q  as satisfying ˆ ˆ( ) ( )G q A q=  and ( ') ( ')
GA q c q= . 
 
Thus, when the GI-specific MQS is suitably low, the equilibrium price-quality schedule that prevails 
under the sui generis scheme is continuous, just as in the benchmark case (with only trademarks) 
discussed earlier. Moreover, similarly to the benchmark case, it corresponds to the schedule of the 
producers who use the standard technology in the bottom range of the quality spectrum (here, for q  
smaller than qˆ ) and to the schedule for certifying producers using the GI-technology in the upper 
range of the quality spectrum (here, for q  larger than qˆ ). But unlike the benchmark case, here not 
all qualities are produced with the production technology that has the lower production cost. 
Specifically, qualities qˆ q q≤ ≤   are produced with the GI technology even if the standard technology 
displays a lower cost in this quality range. What remains true, of course, is that each quality 0q q≥  is 
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produced by the firms with the lowest total cost, where the total cost includes both the production 
and the information cost. The market price-quality schedule that prevails under the sui generis scheme 
when the GI-specific MQS is low is represented by the bold curve in Figure 2a. It is important to 
note that even when GI certification does not entail any higher minimum quality than that which 
applies generally (i.e., 0 0
Gq q= ), the availability of GI certification does affect the equilibrium price-
quality schedule because, as discussed, it affects the information cost required to establish and 
maintain reputation. 
 
Result 2(b): When 0 ', ''
Gq q q∈   , the market price-quality schedule that prevails in equilibrium under a sui generis 
system is  
(15) 0 1
0
( ),      for [ , )
( )
( ),      for 
G
G
A q q q q
P q
G q q q
 ∈≡ 
≥
 
where we define 1q  and ''q  as satisfying 1 0( ) ( )
G GA q c q=  and ( ) ( '')GA q c q= . 
 
Note that when the GI-specific MQS takes on a value in the given intermediate range, the market 
price-quality schedule under the sui generis scheme presents a discontinuity, i.e., we find a gap in the 
set of quality that can be supported by the market in equilibrium. Such a quality gap is typical in the 
presence of production technologies with comparative advantage over different quality ranges (e.g., 
Falvey and Kierzkowski 1987 and in Flam and Helpman 1987). Similar to the case of a low value of 
the GI-specific MQS, not all supplied qualities are produced by the firms with the lowest production 
cost: qualities 0
Gq q q≤ ≤   are produced with the more expensive GI-technology instead of the 
cheaper standard technology. The bold curve in Figure 2b represents the market price-quality 
schedule for intermediate values of the GI-specific MQS. 
 
Result 2(c): When 0 ''
Gq q≥ , the market price-quality schedule that prevails in equilibrium under a sui generis system 
is  
(16) 
 ∈

≡ ∈

≥


0
2
0
( ),       for [ , )
( ) ( ),        for [ , )
( ),        for 
G
G
A q q q q
P q B q q q q
G q q q
 
where we define 2q  as satisfying 2 0( ) ( )
G GB q c q= . 
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A quality gap (over qualities 2 0[ , )
Gq q q∈ ) also characterizes the equilibrium market price-quality 
schedule when the GI-specific MQS has high values, but in this case (as in the benchmark case) all 
supplied qualities are produced with the technology with the lower production cost. Here, we find 
that there exists a group of producers who use the GI technology but do not certify (i.e., they only 
use their own trademark), and this ends up supplying the quality range between q  and 2q . The bold 
curve in Figure 2c represents the market price-quality schedule for high values of the GI-specific 
MQS.  
 
4.3. GI Certification Based on Certification Marks 
IP protection for GIs in the United States is provided through the standard trademark system, 
usually as certification marks. Certification marks for GIs only certify the origin of the product and 
provide no other quality-related claim or specification. For example, the certification mark 
“Washington Apples” certifies that the apples are produced in the state of Washington, with no 
specific additional quality standard that needs to be met by producers (Winfree and McCluskey 
2005).  
In our framework, certification under a certification mark scheme reveals to consumers the 
technology used in production, similar to the sui generis GI certification discussed in the foregoing 
sections. But, because certification marks do not envision any quality specification, it then follows 
that a certification mark system in our modeling framework is equivalent to a sui generis system with 
the minimal possible minimum quality, that is, =0 0
Gq q . Still, as illustrated in the foregoing analysis, 
the presence of such a GI certification is valuable because it curtails the moral hazard behavior of 
producers by limiting their ability to cut costs were they to depart from equilibrium by supplying a 
quality lower than expected. The explicit graphical representation of the equilibrium market price-
quality schedule with the certification mark scheme is omitted because of space limitations (it is 
essentially as in Figure 2a, but with =0 0
Gq q ). Note that, again, with the certification mark scheme we 
find that there is a range of qualities that do not minimize production costs. Specifically, qualities 
q q q′ ≤ ≤   are produced with the GI technology despite the fact that the cost of producing them with 
the standard technology is lower.  
 
20 
 
5. Welfare Implications 
Relevant welfare questions for the problem at hand include the following: (a) What are the welfare 
implications of adding a GI certification scheme to a situation in which only private trademarks are 
used? and (b) If GI certification is contemplated, which is best, a sui generis system or a certification 
mark system? Welfare impacts can arise for both consumers and producers. As we have shown, the 
availability of GI certification reduces the size of the reputation premium needed to support quality 
in the upper range of the quality spectrum, thereby taking the reputation equilibrium closer to the 
first best. This is illustrated in Figure 3 by the equilibrium price-quality schedule ( )GP q  (i.e., as 
Figures 2a to 2c show, the equilibrium price-quality schedule moves closer to the marginal cost 
schedule). This reputation premium reduction is due to the revelation of some information 
regarding the GI-certified product to consumers. Specifically, both certification marks and 
certification via the sui generis scheme reveal the technology used in production and, in addition, 
certification via the sui generis scheme also informs consumers that the product is at least of quality 
0
Gq . By making these pieces of information common knowledge, certification limits the ability of 
producers to reduce costs by cutting quality, and hence certification makes cheating a less attractive 
option to producers. At the lower end of the price distribution, on the other hand, the price-quality 
schedules with trademarks only and with trademarks plus GI certification coincide (as shown in 
Results 1 to 3).  
For consumers, it is clear that the GI introduction effects discussed in the foregoing can 
only improve their welfare because they lead to a reduction in the equilibrium prices of some 
qualities. The welfare impacts on producers, however, are generally non-positive and depend 
critically on whether the introduction of GI certification is construed to happen ex ante (that is, 
before the investment in reputation-building is undertaken) or ex post (that is, after firms have 
already built up their reputation by the use of trademarks). From an ex ante perspective, perfect 
competition with free entry, coupled with the condition that all factors are in perfect elastic supply, 
means that, ex ante, the surplus of producers is nil. But the introduction of a GI system after firms 
have already built up their reputation by the use of trademarks can have negative ex post impacts on 
producers’ welfare. Exactly which producers (in terms of what quality they provide) are affected 
depends on the structure of demand. To discuss the possible welfare effects in more detail, a closer 
look at preferences is needed.  
To put some more structure on the preference relation ( , )U q θ
 
in (2), assume that 
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(17) 0,qU >  0,qqU <  0,Uθ >  and 0.qU θ >  
Thus, in addition to the assumptions that consumers value quality and that consumers with higher θ  
have a higher taste for quality, discussed earlier, we also assume that utility is concave in quality and 
that the marginal utility of quality is larger for consumers with higher values of θ . Note that, for 
each θ − consumer, ( , )U q pθ −  defines a set of convex indifference curves in the p q×  space with a 
southeast preference direction. The slope of such indifference curves satisfies qdp dq U=  and thus 
it is increasing in θ  (for any give q ). For each consumer, optimality requires achieving the highest 
feasible indifference curve, which in a competitive equilibrium is constrained by the price-quality 
schedules derived in the foregoing analysis (and the requirement that ( , )U q pθ ≥ ).   
Depending on the particulars of the utility function, we can have either that 
0( ,0) ( )U q u P q≡ ≥  , in which case every consumer buys the product in question (i.e., the market is 
covered), or that 0( )u P q< , so that some consumers at the lower end of the taste distribution are 
not consuming the product in question (i.e., the market is uncovered). Rather than discussing all 
possible cases, it is instructive to consider the situation in which there exists a consumer type iθ  
who, under the trademarks-only system, is indifferent between consuming quality iq  produced by 
the standard technology and quality iq  produced by the GI technology. This is illustrated in Figure 
3 where ( )P q  is the equilibrium price-quality schedule with trademarks only and ( )GP p  is the 
equilibrium price-quality schedule with trademarks plus GIs, and where we are essentially 
considering the case of Result 2b. Prior to the introduction of GI certification, consumers with type 
iθ θ<  are served by the standard technology, if they buy the good at all, and consumers with  iθ θ>  
are supplied by the GI technology. In this illustration the introduction of a GI certification system 
results in a new consumer type ii iθ θ<  being indifferent between consuming quality iiq  produced 
by the standard technology and a quality iiq  produced by the GI technology.  
In Figure 3, consumers with low taste for quality, specifically with iiθ θ≤ , are not affected 
by the introduction of the GI certification. But consumers with higher taste for quality, specifically 
with iiθ θ> and consuming qualities iiq q≥ in the new equilibrium, are strictly better off under the 
GI certification scheme because they can take advantage of the lower price-quality schedule. As for 
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producers, those serving the low end of the quality spectrum, that is, producing qualities iiq q≤  in 
the illustration of Figure 3, are not affected by the introduction of GI certification as this market 
segment continues to be serviced by producers who do not certify. Standard-technology producers 
who, prior to the introduction of GI certification, are active in the quality range ii iq q q< <  lose 
their reputation premium. Specifically, producers in the range ii iiq q q< <  lose their investment in 
reputation because these qualities disappear from the market, whereas producers in the quality range 
ii iq q q≤ ≤  lose their reputation premium because these qualities are now provided by the GI 
technology with the lower price-quality schedule ( )GP q .20 iq q> Producers in the quality range  also 
partially lose their investment in reputation because, although they are still relying on the same GI 
technology, the advent of GI certification has reduced the reputation premium. The introduction of 
GI certification illustrated in Figure 3 also gives rise to new production opportunities for the quality 
range i iq q q< < , which was not serviced with the trademarks-only system but is now serviced by GI 
producers after the introduction of GI certification.  
It is apparent that the introduction of a GI certification scheme affects consumers and 
producers in radically different ways. Consumers, to the extent that they prefer high quality, are 
clearly better off with lower prices (otherwise, if they prefer low quality, they are just as well off). As 
for producers, if they have already sunk the investment in reputation before the introduction of the 
certification scheme, they are either indifferent (at the lower end of the quality spectrum) or are 
negatively affected by the introduction of GI certification because the premium they can charge for 
their established reputation is curtailed. Note that producers using either the standard or the GI 
technology can lose from the introduction of GI certification.  
As for aggregate welfare—the sum of consumer and producer surpluses in this model—the 
overall effects are more subtle and depend critically on whether one takes the ex ante or ex post 
perspective. With zero discounted profits for new producers, it is clear that, ex ante, only consumer 
surplus matters. From this point of view, the introduction of GI certification always increases 
welfare because it further improves the efficiency with which reputable brands can supply quality to 
                                                          
20 In this quality range one can argue that the loss of the prior investment in reputation is only partial 
(instead of total) if these producers can relocate production to a GI region while keeping their own 
private trademarks, a scenario consistent with the assumed free entry condition of the model.  
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consumers.21
( )F θ
 But if the introduction of GI certification happens after reputation has been 
established by all firms, the losses to producers need to be balanced against the gains to consumers. 
It seems that no general conclusion can be obtained in this setting without making more 
assumptions about the distribution of consumers . To show that, indeed, GI introduction can 
cause a reduction in overall welfare, consider the case in Figure 3 and suppose that iiθ  is the largest 
value in the support of ( )F θ , and that there is a positive mass m  of consumers with this type. Prior 
to GI certification, all consumers are served by the standard technology, with consumers of type iiθ  
enjoying quality iiq . With GI certification, however, the consumers with type iiθ  can now be served 
by the GI technology (at quality iiq ). In such a case, by construction, there is no welfare gain to 
consumers. But established producers suffer a reputation premium loss of ( ) ( )ii iim P q c q −   per 
period, which is not balanced by any gain to GI producers (the present value of their reputation 
premium is dissipated in the reputation-building stage of the entry period). Of course, it is quite 
possible that ( )F θ  is such that consumer gains from the introduction of GIs exceed producer losses, 
but the fact remains that it does not appear possible to derive general conclusions as to aggregate 
welfare impacts of the ex post introduction of GI certification. 
Finally, we wish to discuss which GI certification scheme—the sui generis system or that with 
certification marks—is to be preferred. From the foregoing discussion, the most meaningful setting 
for this question is from an ex ante perspective, in which case the certification scheme that 
maximizes social welfare is the one that maximizes aggregate consumer surplus. Because the two GI 
systems in our model differ by their MQS, it will prove useful to discuss how the GI-specific MQS, 
0
Gq , affects consumer surplus. As is evident based on Results 2a to 2c, the value of the GI-specific 
MQS determines the shape and position of the equilibrium market price-quality schedule and hence 
the price-quality combinations that are available to consumers. The available price-quality 
combinations, in turn, determine the surplus that each consumer type can derive in the market. 
Hence, the specific welfare-maximizing value of the GI-specific MQS will generally depend on the 
distribution of consumer types. Specifically, the optimal value of the GI-specific MQS has to 
                                                          
21  Of course, if the distribution of consumers ( )F θ  is such that all consumers are bunched at the 
low end of quality preferences (e.g., iiθ θ≤  in the case of Figure 3), it is possible that GIs have no 
effect.  
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balance the welfare losses of consumers whose quality selection is constrained by the value of 0
Gq  
and the welfare gains to consumers who purchase the GI-certified product. By raising the value of 
0
Gq  , ( )G q  is pushed down toward production costs; hence, the prices of all qualities above 0
Gq  
decline. But, by raising 0
Gq  above 'q , some qualities are no longer supplied in the market (i.e., 
consumers have less quality options to choose from).  
With an  exogenously determined 0
Gq , a comparison between the price-quality schedules 
under the sui generis and certification mark schemes reveals that (i) for any given value of ≤0 '
Gq q  
every consumer type is at least as well off with the sui generis scheme as with certification marks 
(because of lower prices in the upper end of the quality range with the sui generis scheme); and (ii) for 
any given value of >0 '
Gq q , the scheme that provides the largest welfare depends on the distribution 
of consumer types. For the latter case, in fact, some qualities in an intermediate range are not 
supplied under the sui generis scheme while the same qualities would be supplied with a certification 
mark scheme (hence, consumers with intermediate values of θ  would be better off with certification 
marks). But the sui generis scheme leads to lower prices in the upper part of the quality spectrum 
compared to a certification mark, and hence consumers with relatively high values of θ  would be 
better off with the sui generis scheme. Finally, if the value of 0
Gq  can be chosen optimally so as to 
maximize aggregate welfare, the sui generis scheme is obviously unambiguously better than the 
technology scheme for any given distribution of consumers (because it is always possible to set 
0 0
Gq q= ). 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have developed a reputation model to assess the role of certification for agricultural 
and food products with a regional identity, known as geographical indications, in a context in which 
firms already have access to private trademarks to establish their reputation for quality. The model 
nests the concept of firm reputation that provides one of the traditional justifications for 
trademarks, with a meaningful definition of collective reputation that can be ascribed to GI labels. 
We have shown that trademarks and GI certification can be viewed as complementary instruments 
for the purpose of credibly signaling quality to consumers in a competitive equilibrium. Thus, our 
model provides a rationale for the concurrent use of GI certification and trademarks, a feature that 
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is quite common for agricultural and food products that claim superior quality because of their 
geographical origin. 
Several instructive aspects on the role of certification in quality provision and reputation 
formation emerge from the model. First, we show that certification reduces the divergence between 
the reputation equilibrium and the equilibrium that would prevail under perfect information by 
lowering the cost of establishing reputation compared to a situation with only trademarks. Hence, 
certification improves the ability of reputation to operate as a mechanism for assuring quality. 
Second, in our model the welfare gains that arise from GI certification accrue to consumers, 
especially those with a taste for higher qualities. This is because certification, by raising the price that 
entrants can command, reduces the cost of building a reputation and hence the value of an 
established reputation. In our model, producers are either unaffected or are negatively affected by 
the introduction of a GI certification scheme. This observation may provide a rationale for industry 
resistance to the introduction of GI certification from eligible producers who have already 
committed resources towards building a reputation at the time the certification is introduced. As a 
caveat, we note that what our model can say about producer welfare is limited by our assumption 
that all factors of production are in perfectly elastic supply. Insofar as land supply to the industry of 
interest is upward sloping, expanding production will increase the returns to land (what is typically 
measured as producer surplus). And, in our setting, it is clear that GI certification tends to expand 
the output of the GI region, with possible benefits to producers in that region that are not 
accounted for in the analysis. 
Our model also considers the features of two major forms of GI certification schemes, the 
EU-style sui generis system and the US-style certification mark approach. We show that the type of 
GI certification matters, and that the features of the certification scheme play an important role in 
mitigating the informational problems connected with supplying quality for experience goods. Both 
of these types of GI certification work by making common knowledge some relevant information, 
which in turn mitigates the inherent moral hazard problem by limiting the ability of producers to 
operate opportunistically. In our model, a sui generis scheme discloses more information than a 
certification mark scheme and it is generally preferable to a certification mark scheme.  
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Figure 1. Equilibrium price-quality schedule with trademarks only 
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Figure 2a. Price-quality schedule with trademarks and sui generis GI certification 
with 0 0[ , ')Gq q q∈  
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Figure 2b. Price-quality schedule with trademarks and sui generis GI certification 
with 0 [ ', '')Gq q q∈  
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Figure 2c. Price-quality schedule with trademarks and sui generis GI certification 
with 0 ''Gq q≥  
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Figure 3. Consumers’ choices with trademarks only and with trademarks plus GI 
certification  
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